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R E G I N A L D  H E R B O L D  G R E E N
To plan is to choose.
Choose to go forward.
— J.K. Nyerere
M w alim u Nyerere is not prim arily a political economist, nor is he in any 
sense a technical econom ist. As is evident from his time as president, his 
role in the creation of the Southern African Development Com m unity (then 
the Sou thern  African D evelopm ent Co-ordination Conference), and his 
post-presidential heading of the South Comm ission, he does believe pro­
duction  econom ics and the political econom y of distribution (of power and 
justice as well as of goods and services) are im portant.T he reason lies in his 
perception of developm ent.
For M w alim u developm ent is about people. He said ‘m an’, bu t would 
probably accept the change as he agrees that women are often exploited 
and excluded on gender lines, and  the Arusha Declaration includes sex in its 
list of unacceptable bases for differentiation. H um an beings are perceived 
by him  as the ends as well as the chief m eans; as the justification for, as well 
as the judges of, developm ent.
D evelopm ent is no t in this context to be read simply as econom ic devel­
opm ent. In his perspective (as in that of m ost poor people) the econom ics 
of production  and distribution (in particular those to make possible escape 
from  poverty) are seen as necessary, if never sufficient, m eans to develop­
m ent. H um an  developm ent, including household livelihood developm ent 
as seen by hum an beings and by society, is perceived as a basic hum an 
right. In M w alim u’s case the argum ent is not that traditional hum an rights 
should be postponed , bu t ra ther that the achievement of freedom  of ex­
pression and of voting in Tanzania, as the 1950s turned into the 1960s, was 
robbed of m uch of its m eaning by the lack of freedom from hunger and, 
especially for rural w om en, from excessive workloads, so that priority needed 
to be given to catching up  on social and econom ic rights.
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T he  stress laid on people may lead either to a m isin terp reta tion  of 
M w alim u’s concept of hum an-centred developm ent as individualist in the 
E uropean enligh tenm ent/1980s neo-liberal tradition , or to supposing a 
contradiction lies between it and the central role he believes States m ust 
play in development. T his is a misreading; people for M w alim u (as in both 
historic African social perceptions and in Rom an Catholic social doctrine) 
exist only in their relationships with other people and with hum an-con- 
structed institutions, that is, in society. Certainly, there is, in bo th  thought 
and practice, a tension betw een hum an developm ent in society in relation­
ship to others, and the interests (even rights) of individual hum an beings. 
T hat tension is the com m on coin of socio-political conceptualisation and 
practice, not unique to Nyerere nor to Tanzania.
M w alim u’s overriding concern in respect of econom ics and political 
economy is very similar to one of Adam S m ith’s m ain concerns. Sm ith, 
who styled himself a m oral philosopher, believed for both practical and 
norm ative reasons that no nation could be great and prosperous if the m a­
jority of its people were poor and miserable. H e contended that it was a 
prim ary duty in ‘moral econom y’ to enable them  to escape from  w hat we 
would now call absolute poverty, and that m aking this possible is the pri­
m ary economic duty of the State. On the particular functions of the State, 
Sm ith and Nyerere (in very different contexts) certainly did no t com e to 
similar conclusions. Even so, Sm ith’s very similar moral distaste for collu­
sive behaviour by entrepreneurs of self-enrichm ent and by econom ic power 
clusters turning the State into their tool is alm ost as robustly and repeat­
edly stated as Nyerere’s has been.
A Problem of Levels and Audiences
T he  writings and speeches of Nyerere do not lend themselves to easy analy­
sis, bu t do lend themselves to easy m isreading as hopelessly self-contradic­
tory. W hile there are tensions and secondary contradictions in his thinking, 
it is a m isreading to suppose they are basic. Two factors explain m any of the 
apparent clashes.
F irst, M walim u’s thought has not been static. Both additional reading 
and thought and, probably even m ore, experience have led to change. T his 
change is evolutionary as to the central vision of developm ent, b u t som e­
times m uch more revolutionary, or at least discontinuous, so far as eco­
nom ic instrum ents are concerned.
Second, M walim u’s thought is not simple; nor has he fulfilled only one 
role. Practical politician and statesm an; pragm atic negotiator and princi­
pled prophet; consciousness-enhancing teacher and advocate; m oral and 
developm ent philosopher and publicist are some of the m ost evident pairs. 
Clearly, what is em phasised and how it is presented varies, depending on
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the purpose or, m ore usually, balance of purposes. Because as president he 
had not time to write reflective overall volumes, N yerere’s w ritten record 
consists largely of speeches of very varying purposes to diverse audiences; 
of quite uneven im portance at the tim e, and doubtless of hugely different 
degrees of ephemerality and lasting im portance. T his is supplem ented by 
mem ories, not always accurate, of verbal com m unications or unpublished 
speeches and papers even more subject to the same limitations.
T he  other standard difficulty of trying to guess how m uch input a m ajor 
figure m ade in any particular speech or paper does not usually hold. N o 
published, and no significant, speech or paper has been other than to his 
outline and revised by him. Evidently the same certainty cannot hold for 
joint products (for example, the A rusha D eclaration is largely his, while the 
South Com m ission Report is very m uch a com posite).T his is even m ore 
true of official papers issued on behalf of the presidency.
In each of his roles, and in m ost individual speeches, M walimu has been 
concerned, albeit to varying degrees, with both distributional/relational and 
production economics. For example, in its early conceptualisation ujamaa 
was basically an African social-contract modelling exercise. In that respect 
it resembles Locke rather than Rousseau, let alone Hobbes. T he  moral 
econom ic concern is present, bu t w ithout m uch guidance as to produc­
tion. Later speeches raised the stress on production econom ics on the basis 
that m odern technology and econom ies of scale both allowed and required 
modifying social as well as economic organisation so long as basic equity 
concerns were m et. However, in practice, production  enhancem ent (as 
opposed to participation and access to services) was never central to ujamaa 
rural policy articulation and practice, to the despair of some political eco­
nomic practitioners who saw m ajor bu t lost opportunities on that front. 
Since dom inant perceptions, including the president’s, of what villagers 
wished to do in com m on were wrong on the econom ic front (partly be­
cause the technological possibilities were som ething of an optical illusion 
and pardy because little effort was m ade to research and extend them ) this 
lack of em phasis may have been just as well. It does, however, illustrate 
M w alim u’s willingness to delegate large areas of socio-econom ic policy ar­
ticulation with, arguably, too infrequent critical exam ination of results. In 
general President Nyerere was very wise in delegating with little in terfer­
ence but, arguably, less so in not institutionalising reporung back for m oni­
toring and review.
V I S I O N  OF  H U M A N - C E N T R E D  D E V E L O P M E N T
Pragmatism and Principles
If developm ent is about people, and econom ics is im portant as a m eans to 
em powering them , then econom ic policies, institutions and program m es 
are m eans to the end of developm ent. Failure of a policy or institution ,
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therefore, or a changed context, is a good reason to alter the policy or 
institution; even suddenly and radically. In that sense Nyerere was usually 
highly pragm atic on econom ic policies and institutions.
T he exceptions appear to have been largely cases in which a pragm atic, 
institutional or procedural issue had become in tertw ined with a po in t of 
principle. An example was the 1972 Income Tax Bill. In practice its m ain 
provisions simplified the taxation system by cutting out all deductions, 
broadening the nil tax band and separating spouses’ incom es for tax pur­
poses, rather than significantly altering progressivity or incentives (other 
than for both spouses to work). However, the N ational Assembly in a pre­
lim inary vote rejected it after a debate opposing progressive taxation .T he 
president then indicated that he would view the issue as one of confidence 
and call presidential and parliam entary elections if the Bill was no t recon­
sidered and passed; which it was. T his decision rather startled  his eco­
nom ic technocrats who, given the actual content of the Bill, had considered 
am endm ents on secondary items as a m atter of political prudence rather 
than principle.
Private ownership of productive assets is usually assum ed to have been 
an exception to this pragm atism , bu t Nyerere at no po in t argued for all 
productive property to be State-ow ned. Indeed, at least in respect of agrar­
ian property and small business, his preferred m ode was a com m unal/house- 
hold/co-operative mix which drove m ore orthodox M arxists into at least as 
great fits of irritation as it did orthodox capitalists. Accountability, protec­
tion of the public interest, avoidance of exploitation and limiting the de­
gree of foreign ownership, appear to have played m ore basic roles than 
narrow ly-defined‘m ode of production’ questions. T he separation of public 
office from  private business ownership has rested prim arily on the very 
Sm ithian concern of conflict (or collusion) of interest, no t on a moral aver­
sion to all enterprise proprietors or managers.
Indeed, instrum ental pragmatism was arguably carried too far. Policy, 
and especially institutional structure shifts, were em braced w ithout careful 
enough exam ination of whether the policies or institutions were substantial 
con tribu to rs to the problem  or could readily be im proved by m arginal 
m odification. N or was adequate attention always paid to  w hether the pro­
posed new policies and institutions were relevant to overcom ing the prob­
lems, or could in practice be im plem ented effectively enough to produce 
the desired results.
A very evident example is the post-1970 cycles from basically co-operative, 
to m arketing authority, to marketing board/co-operative to mixed agricul­
tural produce marketing for major crops. W hat could have been solved within 
any of the systems (for example, enforcing prom pt paym ent, representa­
tional or m arket accountability, probity) was not done, and expensive shifts 
were m ade both w ithout reference to historic experience as to w hat they 
could not achieve (not least radically lower costs or higher world prices), 
nor to resolving the conundrum  that any produce buyer (including private
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ones) could hold the banking system (and ultimately the taxpayer via the 
T reasury) to ransom  by threatening not to buy from the peasants because 
it was politically and morally unacceptable. While the detailed mistakes 
were clearly not articulated by the president personally, the general ten ­
dency to substitute frenetic institutional change for serious problem-solving 
in a m ajor field over the last 15 years of his presidency, was a serious con­
strain t on making good his rural-household-focused developm ent vision, 
and  indeed remains so today.
‘Argue, D on't Shou t’: Constraints On the Possible 
M w alim u has certainly neither assum ed that what existed could not be 
altered, nor that the possible was always (or even usually) the same as that 
which was desirable in principle. It may well be that he erred on the side of 
assum ing m ore could be altered faster than was in fact the case, bu t an 
ultra-cau tious or pessimistic perspective would have achieved far less posi­
tive change as well as incurring fewer costs of over-extension. M walim u 
has always had a clear realisation that Tanzania and the State were h istori­
cally and internationally constrained, and advocated negotiating to m ax­
imise degrees of freedom, not shouting as one rushed headlong into a brick 
wall.
Probably the most dram atic case is that of relations with the World Bank 
and IM F  in 1979-85. T he president objected both  to some elem ents of the 
B ank/F und package proposals and to their neo-liberal rhetoric, as well as 
m ore basically to their rather overt attem pt to in troduce comprehensive 
external vetting of, rather than advice on, econom ic and social policy. So 
long as he was advised that alternative approaches m ight be viable, and 
believed T anzanian negotiators had not exhausted the limits of the attain­
able, he resisted the first S tructural Adjustm ent Program m e (SAP). W hen, 
in 1984, he becam e convinced no alternative resource mobilisation approach 
was viable he sharply shifted position. M ost of the SAP changes date to the 
1984 Budget. (Significantly it was crafted outside any actual set of external 
proposals, and  w ithout formal consultation with international financial in­
stitu tions, even if it was drawn up with an eye to external acceptability). 
T h a t B udget, like the 1985 negotiation of the 1986 SAP, dates from his 
presidency. Final approval by the National Executive Com m ittee of Chama 
Cha M apinduzi (C C M ) in 1986 was secured only because of his strong 
advocacy o f it as the best possible outcom e under the circumstances. T ha t 
also illustrates his determ ined loyalty to the new president while serving as 
con tinuing Party  chairm an .T hat no similar controversy arose in respect to 
‘good governance’/dem ocratisation was because by the m id-1980s Nyerere 
believed th a t the quarter of a century since 1960 had made the one-party 
approach to developm ent, as well as to governance, obsolete, and experi­
ence (particularly, bu t no t only, on journeys abroad) had taught him it was 
dangerously vulnerable to  abuse. His efforts in 1986 to revitalise and re­
form  C C M  convinced him  that the external stim ulus of rival parties had
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4becom e necessary. Therefore, his advocacy of and teaching tow ard change 
in respect to Tanzania and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) pre-dates the new 
W estern fashion for advocating m ulti-party dem ocracy instead of central­
ised, authoritarian, Bismarckian ‘development S tates’.
Principles N ot For Sale
Pragm atism  on m eans, and realism on room  for m anoeuvre, have not been 
seen by N yerere as inconsisten t with firm ness as to  p rin c ip les . T he  
pre-A rusha Declaration economic strategy was arguably, in large m easure, 
a colonial inheritance. But it was accepted (indeed not seriously reviewed 
or modified) for five years because it was seen as being consistent with 
general increases in household economic welfare and with Tanzanian ad­
vancem ent toward the ownership and control of econom ic activity. Its fail­
ure to further these objectives, even during a period of m oderate grow th, 
led to the major policy and institutional transform ation em bodied in the 
Arusha Declaration.
Dom estically-organised opposition to econom ic policy changes, o ther 
than inertia and avoidance, was usually low and low-powered over 1961-85. 
M oreover m ost of what there was, was w ith inT A N U /C C M . T herefore pre­
serving principle while altering policy created few clashes.
Externally m atters were somewhat different, and unpredictably so. T he  
principle was that the State should be accountable toTanzanians and there­
fore foreign policy dictation was unacceptable. But this did no t m ean 
either rejection of all foreign ‘rules of the road’ (on com pensation after 
nationalisation for exam ple), or a belief that it was practicable to  dem and 
support irrespective of the proposed resource-provider’s views. Clashes 
therefore occurred not so m uch over basic differences, bu t over the style of 
external response, for example, with the then Federal G erm any over the 
degree of downgrading of the then G erm an D em ocratic R epublic’s diplo­
m atic status after U nion with Zanzibar. T he breaks on econom ic aid with 
the U K , following the weak British reaction to the R hodesian rebellion in 
1965 and theTanzanian decision in 1968 to shift responsibility for colonial 
pensions to the U K , were partly m iscalculations on bo th  sides (avoided in 
the later case of the nationalisation of buildings) and partly  ra ther em o­
tional and adventurist responses by the U K  rather than  Tanzania.
R E G I N A L D  H E R B O L D  G R E E N
Participation, Production and Progress
B ecause basic hum an needs, including public services, socio-political 
freedom s and time to participate in governance, all require m aterial re­
sources, M walimu has always seen growth in production  of resources as 
im portant. H e would reserve zero growth for countries and persons who 
were already clearly not poor. Indeed, so long as inflation was low, the
8 5
salary policy for the public service was to hold the m iddle- and upper-level 
scales (m ediated for individuals by prom otion), to allow increases at the 
bo ttom  in order to reduce the gap betw een top and bottom  incomes.
T his concern also led to condem nation of waste which Mwalimu branded 
as a sin particularly in poor, w ould-be socialist countries. Efficiency in p ro­
viding ou tputs or services and in achieving an investible surplus were al­
ways tests applied to public sector enterprises. Failure in respect of these 
tests led to a real risk of the m anagers losing their position and/or institu­
tional restructuring, although w hether this happened as often or as effi­
ciently as it should have done is a rather different question.
F o r the same reason (seeing resources and investment as key to making 
hum an-centred  developm ent feasible) M walim u believes unpleasant eco­
nom ic policy decisions and actions, and present austerity for future re­
tu rns, are likely to be frequently necessary. Tanzania has followed a relatively 
high and relatively well-enforced (as well as progressive) overall tax policy, 
and in bo th  1974 and 1980-1 its response to economic crises included 
severe austerity; for the G overnm ent as well as, or more than, for the pu b ­
lic. E quity  in sacrifice and the preservation of basic services and external 
defence capacity, not the avoidance of sacrifice, have been the underlying 
constraints on cuts.
An abiding them e in N yerere’s policies was broadening access to partici­
pation  (particularly by rural farm ing households) in production, access to 
services, and involvement in governance and politics. In that sense he acted 
(with som e deviations in practice) on the prem ise that good governance 
accountable to the perceived needs of ordinary people (that is, as perceived 
by them ) was the goal. He saw well-crafted governance designed by ex­
perts to deliver w hat they believed was good for people, as inadequate de­
spite an abiding, but not always well rew arded, faith in expertise. In that 
sense the accountability argum ent for national independence also informs 
his view of dom estic governance; unlike m any other African leaders. H e 
has, however, been frank in saying that ‘all governm ents, my own included’ 
have been too prone to do things for people (especially those c f the rural 
fam ily sector) w ithout first asking them  what their needs, desires, priorities 
and  abilities were.
A lthough M w alim u also always set a very high value on expertise, he was 
aware th a t the lim ited horizons and educational opportunities imposed by 
history and resource constraints on m ost ordinary households did not limit 
their ability to identify some potential, or even necessary, ways forward. 
B ut a very high priority  was placed on acquiring and using expertise, 
and  a serious hearing  was alm ost always given to those who had , or 
appeared  to  have, such experience. T h is was com bined with frequent, 
and no t always successful, delegation of substantial policy articulation 
an d  im p lem en ta tio n  to  experts, especially  econom ic policy and its 
im plem entation.
P articipation , accountability, and the creative use of expertise inherently
V I S I O N  OF  H U M A N - C E N T R E D  D E V E L O P M E N T
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*give rise to tensions and potential contradictions when pu rsued  together. 
Accountable expertise in the service of a participatory process is m uch 
easier to state as an ideal than to implement in practice; especially in eco­
nom ic enterprises. D ecentralised accountability has a tendency to  lead to 
incoherence at broader levels, while experts (econom ic and other) have a 
tendency to avoid acquiring adequate contextual knowledge, to  resent ef­
fective accountability to non-experts, and to confuse technical m eans (on 
which they are expert) with socio-political ends (on which they usually are 
not). M walimu as president probably erred on the side of giving too m uch 
freedom  to experts and of failing to recognise the degree to which choice of 
m eans influences the end results attained. Perhaps the m ost glaring exam ­
ple was the 1975-80 delegation of agricultural m arketing to an expert group 
in practice accountable only to theWorld B ank.T heir u tter failure to m ain­
tain oversight and guidance for marketing bodies; to propose coheren t and 
sustainable grower price structures; to pay attention to waste avoidance; or 
to have any plausible agricultural strategy, w hether based on m arket incen­
tives, need, or technical potential, cost, and continues to cost, Tanzania 
heavily.
Delegation to experts, when the ministers to whom  they were responsi­
ble were contextually and politically inform ed, often worked well (even 
when the experts were expatriate); as in m uch of the initial establishm ent 
of public enterprise in 1967-8, and the ongoing restructuring o f tax policy 
in 1970-4 and the early 1980s. T he problem is real, not perceptional, and 
one of differing strengths and limitations rather than ideological in the col­
loquial sense. ‘Left’ political ‘experts’ have frequently been at least as con­
textually blinkered and as resentful of accountability constraints as ‘R ight’ 
expatriates.
Participation and Decentralisation
M walim u, perhaps predictably given both African tradition and his stress 
on the im portance of hum an relations at inter-personal as well as systemic 
level, has consistendy favoured decentralisation of accountability and re­
sponsibility. This has been m uch m ore complex in practice with recurren t 
bursts of decentralisation followed by a drift to centralisation (indeed over 
1961-70 the latter was dom inant), and with the tensions betw een direct 
local and indirect institutional accountability frequently inhibiting both.
D ecentralisation in production underlaid the rural bias in the allocauon 
of new resources, and of policy attention and political priority (not always, 
it m ust be said, very effectively). It also inform ed attem pts to create re­
gional growth poles and to reduce the economic dom inance of D ar es Sa­
laam. It was, for example, one elem ent in the decision to move the capital. 
This perspective appears to have had a cumulative impact: rura l/u rban dif­
ferentials have shrunk, and a num ber of growth poles (M orogoro and M beya 
for example) have emerged. Tying the results to particular initiatives other 
than the only partially successful drive for universal access to basic public
R E G I N A L D  H E R B O L D  G R E E N
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services (alternatively stylable basic hum an investm ent through basic edu­
cation, health services and water supply) is m uch harder. D ecentralisation 
in governance has tu rned on having decisions about basic services m ade 
(or at least articulated) at a small enough unit level to allow direct partici­
pation  in decisions, as well as in im plem entation and review by those m ost 
affected .T he evident means to this (elected local and regional governance) 
has been used m uch more erratically, with a very long hiatus from the abo­
lition of the pre-1974 system to the establishm ent of a new one; or, m ore 
accurately, the resurrection of the old with no more than trivial reform s 
and with no regional-tier representative bodies at any stage. Both consulta­
tive and ‘inform al’ accountability m echanism s have been pervasive in in­
fluencing  decisions bu t have hardly form ed an adequate s truc tu re  of 
accountability.
However, resource constraints (especially the lack of inform ed and ex­
perienced personnel) and econom ies of scale have constantly led to a drift 
towards centralisation. T he old district council head tax was inequitable, 
inefficient and extravagant in use of personnel and attention; district coun­
cil adm inistration of prim ary health  and education (and later regional gov­
e rn m e n t ad m in is tra tio n  of A gricu ltu re  E x tension) often left a lm ost 
everything to be desired. T hu s, reform s predicated on efficiency (avoid­
ance of waste, m obilisation of resources and provision of services) were 
repeatedly centralised. F u rth er, it w ould in some term s have been a serious 
erro r to assum e that actual local power structures were such as to make 
decentralisation to adm inistrative units responsible to locally elected bod­
ies synonym ous with accountability to ordinary people. Mwalimu was well 
aware of this, albeit som ewhat reticent about stressing it publicly. S tandby 
and corrective central authority over local decisions was therefore perceived 
to be desirable; presum ably by the president as well as more generally.
Production, Efficiency and Rights
T h e  supposed C artesian dichotom y of production  before traditional hu ­
m an rights or traditional hum an rights before developm ent has not charac­
terised M w alim u’s thought or practice. H e has seen the right to development, 
including econom ic participation and ongoing involvement in governance, 
as in teracting with traditional hum an rights, and has believed progress to ­
ward fuller a ttainm ent of the form er to be necessary to make the latter 
m ore m eaningful. In general, traditional rights appeared to him to have 
progressed further (providing a useful base from  which to defend the right 
to developm ent) implying a general priority in resource allocation to p ro ­
m ote social and econom ic rights em pow erm ent.
Tanzania has had a competitive electoral system for over 30 years and , 
follow ing the in stitu tio n  of a one-party  system , a high p rop ortio n  of 
office-holders held accountable by the electorate through enforced retire­
m ent. W ith rare exceptions it has had an independent, albeit at lower levels 
no t especially efficient or well respected, judicial system. An O m budsm an
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with some im pact exists as, subject to very real resource constraints on 
being heard, does freedom  of expression. Freedom  of religion has never 
been an issue except w hen, as in family law, it conflicts with the freedom s 
of other people. Administrative and police non-feasance or m alfeasance 
(all too prevalent in Tanzania as in any other country bu t probably well 
below the world average) are not approved and are subject to sanction. A 
notable example was the prosecution for m urder of senior police and prison 
officers in a torture case involving witchcraft m urder suspects, and the res­
ignation of the then Interio r M inister (now president) not because he or­
dered, condoned or even knew of the torture, but because he was ultim ately 
responsible for the conduct of his officers. (Ironically, public opinion in the 
concerned areas was in large part behind the convicted officials.) T he  ac­
tual availability of these rights has varied, as is discussed in the essay in this 
volume by Professor Read.
M w alim u’s view that m ore resources would solidify and broaden effec­
tive access to traditional hum an rights was basically correct. A degree of 
econom ic independence, and of free time in which to participate after m eet­
ing basic survival needs, is conducive to fuller political participation. B et­
ter paid m agistrates and police officers with m ore adequate  resources 
(including training) are less open to bribery, more com m itted to getting 
their work done expeditiously and less tem pted to cut corners. T he  tradi­
tional econom ic and social/political and personal hum an rights dichotom y 
(or its com m unity/individual variant) is basically a false one. T he  need is 
for a broad-front advance toward fuller accessibility to all the rights, and 
the basic problem s are ones of balance and allocation of scarce resources.
Making and Executing Decisions
Consensus (well over 50 per cent support although no t necessarily un a­
nimity) is M w alim u’s preferred m ethod of decision-making. It was a route 
he followed as president and as chairm an of CC M  in that he rarely pushed 
through a decision in a deeply-divided Cabinet or N ational Executive, and 
still more rarely used his undoubted power and prestige to im pose his own 
views when they were shared by a minority.
In  m any respects broad  con sensu s on econom ic policy d ec is io n ­
m aking has served Tanzania well. A lthough decisions have som etim es 
taken longer to emerge, they have, with rare exceptions, enjoyed the full 
support of the decision-making bodies and also broad public support. C om ­
bined with fairly good access to decision-m akers for presentation of posi­
tions and a far from identikit leadership, this approach has usually been an 
effective check on action which was nakedly unwise or broadly opposed.
However, two problems have arisen. T he first is in one sense a m easure 
of C C M ’s success as a pluralist, internally-com petitive body .T he range of
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*positions is very wide: one C abinet was only slightly exaggeratedly described 
as ranging from one minister who would have been at hom e in a T hatcher 
C ab inet to two who viewed C hairm an M ao T se-tung as prone to rightist 
deviations. U nder these circum stances consensus in Party and G overn­
m ent was sometimes harder to achieve, and less clear-cut in content, than 
would have been the case with a m ulti-party system with, presum ably, a 
narrow er range of positions in any one Party or coalition.
T he  second problem has been a prolonged inability to make decisions 
w hen the alternatives enjoying support were in opposing directions, so a 
synthesis was impossible and a com prom ise was really a choice for drift or 
overall cross-cancellation of individual policies. T he first serious example 
in respect of economic policy cam e in 1981-4. One position advised signifi­
cant changes centred on restoring fiscal balance, rebuilding exports, and 
reaching a bargained accom m odation with the IM F and World Bank to 
safeguard and augm ent resource transfers. Its proponents did not deny 
that the last elem ent required m easures they, and the president, saw as 
undesirable. T he other position advised full confrontation with the In ter­
national Financial Institutions (IFIs) and, increasingly, with m ost bilateral 
sources of finance, coupled with a totally new and totally non-operational 
‘go it alone’ program m e of econom ic rehabilitation.
F or three years the president declined to choose and approved enough 
individual proposals from each cam p (including fiscal stringency and ex­
p o rt prom otion, but also confrontation with the IFIs) to create an appear­
ance of brokered com promise, although in reality this would have am ounted 
to substantial cross-cancelling with no strategic th rust in either direction. 
T h e  objective econom ic situation eroded steadily until early 1984 when 
M w alim u accepted that a decision one way or another was essential (con­
sensual or not) and that the proponents of the second position were unable 
to articulate any credible set of m easures to im plem ent their proposals how ­
ever desirable they might be in theory.
T he  rolling crisis of the 1981-4 strategic repositioning was the only major 
case o f b locked policy dec isions w hile M w alim u was p res id en t. In 
the  ensu ing  eight years (and especially since he retired  as C hairm an 
o f C C M ) it has becom e m ore  co m m o n  b o th  to  p o s tp o n e  c ru c ia l 
cho ices and to act w ith n e ith er real consensus n o r consideration  of 
consequences.
Teach and Negotiate: D on’t Order and Shout
‘M w alim u’ is not Julius N yerere’s and his people’s title of choice by acci­
dent. H is m ost abiding presence and style is that of a teacher. M walimu 
believes in the power of reasoned discourse and exposition linked to a pas­
sionate advocacy of principled positions and practicable (at least in theory) 
roads toward them . In general this approach has served Tanzanians well, 
and the greatest m isfortunes have arisen when he either let him self be 
convinced by less reasoned approaches (as in the nationalisation of rented
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4buildings whose origin, however disguised, was anti-Asian chauvinism ) or 
became so irritated by disruptive ‘pupils’ as to resort to shouting, as, for 
example, in the 1983 economic sabotage cam paign which he could, and 
should, have blocked or recast into less dangerous form.
However, M walim u was not bemused into supposing that reason can 
override interest, or that all interests are identical. H e knew that teaching 
needed to  be com plem ented  by negotiation ; dom estically  as well as 
externally. In  respect to the acquisition of rented buildings, for exam ple, a 
series of m ajor am endm ents to initial proposals exem pted retired people 
with small incom es who used Swahili-style housing as a pension source; 
took account of the position of owners of new premises who had clearly 
not had time to collect excessive rents; safeguarded bank depositors and 
insurance policy holders (or the taxpayer) by reinstating m ortgage ho lders’ 
rights; and , to a degree, p rotected  mixed occup iers/land lo rds. T hese  
am endm ents radically changed what began as a nearly pure landlord con­
fiscation m easure and were accepted, and apparently welcom ed, by the 
president on the basis of logic, equity, political realism and as a negotiated 
compromise.
This example illustrates two aspects of the way in which dom estic nego­
tiation proceeded. T he first is the very frank and lively debates, involving 
senior politicians, ministers and officials, on how best to im plem ent policy 
decisions, listening to and acting on diverse viewpoints. T he second, and 
m uch more problem atic, is the opaqueness and alm ost random ness of the 
process, especially for anyone not directly involved. T he  key Treasury and 
Attorney G eneral’s officials who modified the buildings acquisitions ar­
ticulation were not by position (even if they happened to be by disposition) 
logical or autom atic collectors and sifters of presentations of divergent valid 
interests. N or were the Attorney General and M inister for F inance the m ost 
obvious political m entors for such a process. Clearly the collection and 
m ediation process was, and is, neither transparent nor systematic enough. 
T hat criticism also relates to the president’s (otherwise highly effective and 
principled) regular collection of ordinary people’s opinions (usually given 
frankly and often bluntly critical of officials and G overnm ent policy) on his 
num erous trips around the country. A president cannot hope to be an 
effective universal om budsm an.
Acting On Consensus: Coercion and Correction 
T he  accusation of naivety som etim es directed at M w alim u in respect 
of his belief that teaching and negotiation would, or could, in all cases 
avoid the need to use coercive action is itself naive. While deeply d istrust­
ing reaching decisions on the basis of small m ajorities ra ther th an  by 
near consensus after an educational p rocess, he does believe th a t a 
legitim ate State having reached a decision by legitim ate m ethods has 
the duty as well as the right to enforce that decision. O ne exam ple has 
been com pulsory vaccination against contagious diseases; oddly so since
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vaccination, while a priority health  policy, is not in fact com pulsory in 
Tanzania.
T he nationalisation legislation, whatever its com pensation provisions and 
room  for bargaining, clearly dem onstrates that M walimu was under no 
illusion about shifting the balance of econom ic power from external and 
m inority owners to dom estic public sector units accountable to the Gov­
ernm ent and, through it, to the citizens (at least in in ten t).T h is was a ‘tea 
p arty ’ involving no m ore than polite discourse and amicable agreem ent. 
Similarly, residence in villages (albeit broadly defined) was m ade com pul­
sory in 1973 because the president believed that living in com m unities and 
being accessible to public services were valid goals backed by broad m a­
jorities, justifying enforcem ent against m inorities who could otherwise block 
their im plem entation. Significantly, com m unal production was not m ade 
m andatory  (only encouraged and, to a degree, backed by preferential re­
source allocation) presum ably because the president correctly believed there 
was no valid consensus in favour of it.
T he  second exam ple illustrates a repeated problem  of coercive action in 
Tanzania: diverse, often over-enthusiastic and sometimes im proper action, 
in term s of the decision and its goals, at regional and district level. Oddly it 
was not prim arily by officials who, by and large, opposed rapid villagisation 
as beyond their technical and resource capacity and, perhaps even m ore, as 
im posing too m uch work. R ather it was by local political leaders (most 
part-tim e and themselves farm ers) whose disregard for adequate physical 
and teaching preparation , practicable phasing and avoiding random  use of 
force, was in some cases awesome. It also illustrates that corrective m echa­
nisms did exist in the system .T he G overnm ent and in particular the presi­
dent (once he realised the dissent was not merely that of a small m inority 
opposing any change) did institu te a corrective process to sort out mis­
in terpretations, offer som e redress (not very widespread or effective), and 
to seek to ensure that the second year’s villagisation was m uch more flex­
ible and consensual; which it was.
T he problem atic issue is again one of institutionalisation. W ith real Party 
and G overnm ent decentralisation the chances for both flexible and contex­
tual im plem entation, and also for m isunderstood and unnecessarily force­
fully im posed  im p le m e n ta tio n  are  he igh tened . T h is  was repeated ly  
dem onstrated from  1961 onwards in econom ic and other fields. It is highly 
doubtful w hether access to higher-level Party and G overnm ent officials 
after the event (which did exist), leading to somewhat less than openly 
publicised correction (which usually happened), was and is adequate in 
term s of M w alim u’s developm ent perspective. Fuller education on guide­
lines for articulators and  im plem enters, together with a parallel m onitoring 
process to suspend apparently unsound  action while a review took place, 
should have been institu tionalised .T his is, of course, not a problem  unique 
to Tanzania; British local tax policy and practice post-1988 illustrates the 
same flaws.
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State, Government, Party and Law
M walimu views the State as a servant of the people and in particular of the 
poor majority. H e does not suppose that m ost States are like that, bu t that 
a dem ocratic State should be.T his requires an activist State in two senses. 
F irst, it is not a neutral groundskeeper setting up  a level cricket pitch (per­
haps a good analogy as groundsm en can, and are expected to, create sur­
faces favourable to the home side). Rather, it is an actor on behalf of whatever 
interest groups or sub-class coalitions control it. Second, it m ust take an 
active role in providing services, regulation and m arket m anagem ent not 
merely in supplying law, order and a stable m acro-econom ic climate; im ­
portant as they are. Access to basic services and opportunities to improve 
their livelihoods are im portant to poor people, as is infrastructure to the 
country m ore generally. At least in an African context therefore the State 
m ust be a m ajor supplier because the private sector cannot afford to pro­
vide services accessible to poor people, nor to build and to operate an ad­
equate national infrastructure.
T h a t Nyerere favoured State corporations in respect of large-scale eco­
nomic activity is true, but he did not view them  as a first choice where 
mixed household-co-operative-com m unal activity appeared feasible, as it 
did in agriculture and retailing. N or w asTanzania ever uniform ly hostile to 
joint ventures or to private enterprise despite the actions taken in the early 
1970s. Regulation was seen to pose almost more problem s than ownership, 
and dom inance of external ownership was believed to be inimical both to 
reinvestm ent of profits and to national participation in senior m anagerial 
positions.T hat view is not, as is sometimes im plied, necessarily either par­
ticularly left-wing or uncom m on among hard-headed econom ic pragm a­
tists {vide Japan, South Korea,Taiwan, Singapore and , for m any years after 
World War II, France). In the late 1960s the only dom estic institution with 
finance and personnel, or the capacity to mobilise them , and able to under­
take leadership in the large enterprise sector was the State. Even then en­
terprises were virtually never run as G overnm ent d ep artm en ts  bu t as 
relatively autonom ous and accountable (in principle at least) economic units 
with fairly clear accounting and viability requirem ents. And through 1977 
they did, as a group, achieve substantial after-tax investible surpluses.
Government and Party
Mwalimu has tended to view the governm ent, including m any m inisters, 
as experts articulating and carrying out policy ra ther than  as political 
decision-makers. This sits somewhat uneasily with m inisters being M Ps 
and those defeated not re-appointable; although appointed M Ps can and 
do serve as m inisters and, indeed, as Prim e M inister. It also creates some 
problem s of differentiating political decisions and their governm ental 
articulation and im plem entation, with the latter subject to political review
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bu t, in principle and to a significant degree in practice, not to day-to-day 
political in tervention.The differentiation problem  has always been greatest 
at local level where G overnm ent and Party are virtually the same and have 
not been distinguished from each other by m ost rural people.
T he  purpose of political bodies (the National Assembly for example) is 
in this perspective to listen to the people, to make basic policy decisions 
(usually but not necessarily on the basis of governm ent proposals), and to 
oversee and review im plem entation.T hey are accountable to the people via 
periodic competitive elections as well as to Party m em bers via a similar 
in ternal process including prim ary elections to choose general election can­
didates. T h a t process clearly has been competitive at prim ary and general 
election stages as evidenced by a high non-re-election rate both in the Party 
and the N ational Assembly. Given the wide range of viewpoints in the Party, 
those changes do affect policy not merely office-holding personnel.
Single Party: Principle or Cotitexiual Pragmatism  
It is quite clear that Nyerere spearheaded the 1963-5 transition to a one- 
party  system, as is discussed in the essay by Professor Kweka in this vol­
um e. W hat is not clear is w hether Mwalimu saw a single Party as a m atter 
of p erm anen t principle or contextual pragm atism . Prior to its adoption he 
spoke o f a need to review the position in about 25 to 30 years (1990-5). By 
the end of the 1980s he was tentatively, but soon m ore definitely, arguing 
that the tim e had come for a m ulti-party  system even though mass public 
dem and was notable by its absence.T he reasons he initially advanced for a 
single Party, taken together w ithT A N U ’s (subsequently C C M ’s) openness 
and in ternal com petitiveness, the genuinely competitive general elections, 
and  the reversion to m ulti-partyism  before there was mass dem and or par­
ticularly strong international pressure on Tanzania for it, strongly suggest 
that the contextual and pragm atic in terpretation is the more accurate.
M w alim u’s attem pts to revitalise and reform  C C M  over 1986-8 led him 
to believe that the prospect of losing office was necessary to achieve a re­
new ed national-developm ent-oriented dynamic in the Party. In May 1990 
he argued that ‘lack of opposition makes the Party feel com placent about 
its real or im agined existence’, leading to a ‘crisis of bureaucracy and de­
spondency’, a critique he had earlier propounded to the then Zam bian 
presiden t K enneth  K aunda in respect of UN1P.
T A N U  and C C M  have never been M arxist-Leninist parties and their 
policy stance (if not the rhetoric of some second-line personnel) has had 
m ore in com m on with radical social dem ocracy than with M arxist-Leninist 
single-party  policy or practice. N or has it ever been a Vanguard Party. 
Because dues collection and record keeping were notoriously bad, it is 
unclear how m any m em bers it had , although it is probable that between 
one household in two and one in four has had a m em ber, which is very high 
for voluntary m em bership parties. T he  failure of the pro-Vanguard Party 
cam paigns w ith inT A N U /C C M  was clearly the result of M walimu’s stance.
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H e believed that a lim ited-access Party was inconsistent with broad par­
ticipation and accountability. His reaction to that, as to other neo-Platonic 
guardianship proposals, was to enquire who was to guard against abuse by 
the guardians.
M w alim u’s thought, unlike that of most single-party advocates, seems 
basically pluralist. H e certainly believes in integral accountability via elec­
toral com petition elements: a significant divergence from  the vast majority 
of single-party systems. H e did not, however, devise a m echanism  to offset 
the reality that continued holding of office (even if w ith changing person­
nel) does tend to dull both accountability and strict morality, and that even 
a small opposition representation from a Party or Parties m ost unlikely to 
win a majority in the near future may improve perform ance on bo th  counts; 
as in Botswana, T he G am bia and Mauritius.
Rule o f Law  — Principle or Means
Tanzania has an independent judiciary and legal system whose greatest 
danger has usually been self-emasculation, not G overnm ent pressure .T he 
G overnm ent has not infrequently lost cases with significant political over­
tones and has regularly accepted the verdicts bo th  in the narrow  sense of 
the case in hand and the broader sense of not legislating to alter the param ­
eters for future decisions. It is difficult to attribute this com m itm ent to the 
rule of law to anyone o ther than the first president (backed by his senior 
legal officers and m ost High C ourt judges), or to explain it on the grounds 
of pragm atism  rather than of principle.
Five major problem s have limited the effectiveness of the rule of law. T he 
lower courts are not in general well regarded in term s of com petence or 
probity. Access to the courts is expensive, and hard for the ordinary  person 
to understand. Legislation (especially in adm inistrative law) to provide a 
legal framework for altered policies is often unduly delayed, resulting in a 
legal vacuum  with extant law anachronistic and inherently proper public 
policy not yet properly legally enacted.The police and the prosecution serv­
ice are short of personnel, finance and expertise which limits the effective­
ness of investigation and the quality of prosecutions. Preventive detention 
has been used, som etim es for political cases (usually actual or potential 
arm ed conspiracy) and for economic cases (largely relating to external trans­
actions).
T he  first four problem s are com m on even to wealthy N o rth ern  coun­
tries and relate primarily to the availability of resources (mainly skilled per­
sonnel but also, in the case of magistrates and clerks, levels of rem uneration 
as w ell).The fourth, preventive detention, is also com m on (openly or cov­
ertly) but raises deeper questions o f principle which are discussed at greater 
length in the essay by Professor Read in this volume.
M walim u appears to have viewed preventive detention  as undesirable 
but less bad than the available alternatives. Rigged trials would have been 
worse; as would have allowing coup plots for which, while they were known
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about, there was not the level of evidence required by a court. There was a 
deep general frustration that cases involving econom ic offences either could 
no t be successfully prosecuted because of inadequate prosecutors or m ag­
istrates, or resulted in relatively trivial sentences. A ttem pts to improve the 
quality of prosecutions were m ade, as were statutory am endm ents, bu t with 
very lim ited success. T he latter led to econom ic sabotage legislation which 
did no t create any new offences no t covered by existing statutes, but seri­
ously eroded procedural safeguards. In  the face of sharp criticism from the 
legal com m unity, including the A tto rney G eneral, it was partly quietly 
dropped and partly reform ed with procedural safeguards after an alarm ­
ing, b u t b rie f, frenzy of accusa tions w hich  th rea ten ed  to becom e a 
w itch-hunt.
M w alim u clearly views the rule of law and an independent judiciary as 
m atters of principle; like competitive elections and accountability. H e has 
been willing to accept limited exceptions, notably preventive detention , 
but he failed to institutionalise the operation of prom pt reporting of cases 
and of prom pt quasi-independent review to reverse abuses in particular 
cases, although he did act, often belatedly, when such cases came to his 
attention.
Economic Strategy Preferences
Tanzania is unusual in that it has a dem onstrable policy bias in favour of 
rural areas in respect to spending m ore than  has been received on fiscal 
account; in relative price m anagem ent (with grower prices for food raised 
m ore rapidly than wages let alone salaries); in the provision of credit and of 
de facto grower subsidies; in policy a ttention ; and in a distinct perception 
that the Party and G overnm ent were prim arily accountable to the rural 
peasant majority. T hat a substantial p roportion  of the resources were none 
too well directed, and th a t some of the policies and institutions were ill- 
designed, does not alter the fact o f the allocations and their in tent. For 
alm ost 25 years the differential betw een u rban  and rural incomes as well as 
inequality of access to basic services has been reduced. T his is sufficiently 
atypical to  suggest it m ust have som e relationship to policy attention and 
resource allocation.
T his rural bias has strongly characterised Nyerere’s thinking. One rea­
son is clear: m ost Tanzanians are poor rural dwellers primarily dependent 
on agriculture (albeit a significantly lower proportion  today than in 1970 
and  m uch lower than in 1961).T herefore people-centred developm ent had 
in his view to focus on rural com m unities. A nother elem ent is more prob­
lem atic. N yerere, because of his background, understood rural peasant 
households better than urban w age-earning ones and, at least until the 
m id -1980s, failed to recognise how m any poor urban households there were.
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This was com pounded by a technical problem: rural p roduction  un it or­
ganisation on a mixed household/com m unal basis poses far fewer techno­
logical or econom y-of-scale problems than does, say, a textile mill or a 
bank. T hus attem pts to introduce wage worker participation in m anage­
m ent were late (early 1970s), cautious, and largely dropped  during  the 
1980s economic crises. T he  process was not helped by the opposition of 
the trade union which correctly feared th a t em ploym ent units based on 
Workers Councils would have more worker support than itself, and would 
(as they did) deal directly with the Party, G overnm ent and em ployers, ex­
posing the single-channel national trade union as the unrepresentative 
idea-less shell it then was. Ironically, statutory wage increases have nor­
mally been proposed by theTreasury on equity and efficiency g rounds with 
no significant M inistry of Labour or trade union input. C om m endable as 
that may be, it underlines the weakness of the M inistry which was sup­
posed to highlight wage-earner needs and the fact that in the case of the 
trade union, Party dom inance led to a lack of initiative and dialogue, even 
though these weaknesses did not characterise C C M  itself.
This analysis, if correct, explains both the positive priority focus on ru ­
ral livelihoods and services, and the rather inadequately conceptualised 
and episodic attention given to urban poverty and to the role of wage work­
ers in enterprise decision-making. The inadequate attention  to urban pov­
erty and urban infrastructure has been particularly evident in respect to 
towns other than D ar es Salaam. With up to 30 per cent of the population 
now urban residents, the accountability principle appears likely to increase 
political and policy attention to issues of urban poverty and livelihoods as 
to some extent it already has from the mid-1980s.
Equity -A ffirm a tiveA ction
Equity (not equality, bu t a limited range of inequality resulting from  supe­
rior quality and quantity of effort) is central to M w alim u’s strategic view of 
development. Policy has regularly sought to provide real increases, p rim a­
rily to low-income earners (this is ironically m uch easier in respect of wage 
earners than peasants), and to allocate cuts progressively (that is, the higher 
the pre-cut welfare, the higher the proportion of cut). Similarly, moving 
forward universal access to basic services (prim ary and adult education , 
prim ary health services, accessible pure water and agricultural extension) 
has enjoyed priority in the social service sector. T he  falls in quality and 
quantity in the early 1980s were partially clawed back from 1985 onw ard, 
albeit with severe problem s of continued infrastructure deterioration , es­
pecially in health.
In a poor country, priority to improving livelihood levels and basic serv­
ice access of poor people necessarily means slower increases at the top. As 
president, Nyerere moved from a policy of not increasing top incom es to 
allow the bottom  to catch up to an ‘all boats float higher’ position. T he 
latter was, as becam e evident in the 1980s, technically and politically
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possible only when resources per capita were expanding. Preferential allo­
cation out of additional resources was, in theTanzanian political economic 
context, relatively easy in the late 1960s and 1970s. Transfers out of shrink­
ing resource in the 1980s to limit losses at the bottom  of income distribu­
tion came to be gravely dam aging to salary earner and small-business morale, 
as well as to many other individuals’ self-perceived incentives. T he presi­
den t accepted that fact reluctantly, slowly, and only partially.
M arkets —M eans or M yths
For M w alim u, markets are a m eans; an im portan t institutional m echanism 
with strengths but also with lim itations and distortions. Therefore, they 
can be m ade m ore serviceable to public policy when managed and/or regu­
lated than when left to their own devices. T his is in fact the standard posi­
tion of political thinkers and of m ost politicians and, at least in respect to 
their own interests, of m ost business people. T he serious operational argu­
m ents tu rn  on identifying m arket distortions and on crafting measures which 
can reduce them  without creating worse new distortions.
In  the context of the 1980s, a substantial proportion of Tanzania’s m ar­
ket m anagem ent m easures becam e highly inefficient; most notably, but not 
uniquely, agricultural m arketing. W hile som e of the problems may have 
been inherent, the better m arket m anagem ent perform ance in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s (especially in atta in ing  full recovery from the 1974-5 
drough t, oil price, and general term s of trade crises) suggests another im­
po rtan t causal elem ent. In a m uch m ore hostile world economy, with re­
du ced  im p o rt capacity  and falling real wages, bo th  institu tional and 
personnel capacity eroded at the sam e tim e making increasing crisis con­
tainm ent necessary. T he result was a sharp decline in quality of G overn­
m ent and public enterprise m arket m anagem ent.
W hat to  do was, and is, a question neither Nyerere nor his successors 
have resolved adequately. ‘M uddling o n ’ came to be seen as increasingly 
im practical, while reversion to pre-independence private enterprise m arket 
m anagem ent was perceived as likely to restore ‘natural’ market failures w ith­
out greatly assisting in providing incentives to producers. Mwalimu does 
a p p ea r  at tim es to have co n fu sed  in s titu tio n a l m eans with ends in 
his defence of certain, by no m eans all, pre-1980 institutional and policy 
arrangem ents.
Exports and Self-Reliance
W hile M w alim u has seen diversification of production and reduction of 
dependence on im ports as necessary com ponents of the development proc­
ess, he has no t advocated trade m inim isation nor delinking in the autarkic 
sense. H is views are consistent with the perfectly respectable economic 
argum ent that some trade is better than  no trade, but that maximisation of 
trade is no t necessarily a valid objective.




R E G I N A L D  H E R B O L D  G R E E N
Only the foreign exchange earned from exports can be allocated by a coun­
try, whatever m echanism s it chooses to use, on the basis of its own priori­
ties. Indeed, in the early 1970s, he once used a quotation from D om  H elder 
Cam ara on the im portance of developing prim ary exports in to  processed 
and m anufactured exports goods as his Easter card message.
For reasons which are no t self-evident, this is a field in which N yerere’s 
views, even though backed by the Treasury and usually by C om m erce and 
Industry, were given low operational priority. T he parts of overall strategy 
linked to export expansion, and especially their diversification/processing 
com ponents, were repeatedly not acted upon. Therefore, not m erely wors­
en ing  te rm s of tra d e  and  an u n fo rtu n a te  in itia l e x p o r t m ix (p lus 
over-valuation especially from 1981-6) bu t also the lack of any export di­
versification dynamic underlayTanzania’s dismal export perform ance after 
the m id-1960s.
By the time serious attention was paid to export rehabilitation and de­
velopment after 1983, resource constraints (and the m arked aversion in 
practice of donors to financing export projects) m eant that recovery re­
m ained limited. In real im port capacity term s, the export peak was 1966; 
an indicator of failure unm atched in any other econom ic sector. T he  sec­
ond poorest series, real per capita external aid peaked in 1973-4 .Together, 
these two series spell out the bed-rock problem  confronting any develop­
m ent strategy in the 1980s.
Fiscal Policy, Exchange Rates, Inflation
On m ost m acro-econom ic policy issues N yerere’s stance was basically cau­
tious. He preferred current expenditure to be balanced by curren t revenue 
(essentially achieved until 1979) and fiscal laxity played a role (even if prob­
ably not a dom inant role) in 1965 and 1979 when there were changes of 
Finance Minister.
T he president very clearly understood that printing m ore m oney with­
out producing or securing more goods to validate it was largely self-defeating. 
His analogy was parachuting sacks of money onto a flood-isolated island 
instead of sacks of grain. While he never supposed prices could be frozen 
by fiat, he may have pu t too m uch faith both in price m anagem ent and 
fiscal policy as m eans to avoid or to m anage down inflation.
Both fiscal balance and limited price m ovem ents have been seen by 
Mwalimu as instrum ental and desirable, but no t as overriding im peratives 
nor as ends in themselves. T he same, contrary perhaps to popular im pres­
sion, holds for his views on exchange rates (a m anaged p rice). O ver 
1967-1973 Tanzania had a relatively active exchange rate policy which 
avoided both massive changes and over-valuation.
His subsequent aversion to devaluation has been in large part a reaction 
to the IM F ’s apparent belief that devaluation is virtually always desirable 
and good on moral as well as on pragm atic contextual grounds, and its 
rather bullying preaching of that fundam entalist creed. T his certainly led
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over 1980-3 to a reluctance to agree to devaluations, whoever proposed 
th e m , w h ich  was unw ise bu t d id  n o t re p re se n t any a d h e ren ce  to  
non-devaluation as an end in itself. (D uring 1982-5 Tanzania did devalue 
several times).
O n each of the above issues M w alim u’s views flowed in general from his 
perception  of econom ic policy as prim arily a set of tools to construct devel­
opm ent and , in particular, from a com bination of contextual pressures and 
from  the advice of m inisters, civil servants and academ ics he trusted; pre­
dom inantly  bu t not exclusively Tanzanians. T he  period when they appeared 
least coheren t was 1981-4 when he was receiving very sharply divergent 
advice from  his main economic m inisters and their civil servant/advisor 
team s.
National Development, African Regionalism 
and the World Economy
N ational Development/National Com munity
Julius N yerere’s perception of developm ent is prim arily national within a 
con tinental and an intercontinental context. N ational because that is the 
largest com m unity which can, at least in the m edium  term , be made m ean­
ingful in Africa. O ne might query w hether in m any African States the 
nation  is a viable community, but in Tanzania the answer is increasingly 
affirm ative in respect of m ainland Tanzania, although not in respect of 
the U nion with Zanzibar. Indeed the continuing viability of Tanzania as a 
nation  State with a real sense of national com m unity is one of M w alim u’s 
m ost notable successes.
In a broader context M walimu is well aware of the fact that individual 
African States, even relatively large ones like Tanzania, are small, weak and 
unilaterally externally dependent. His early analogy was that small and weak 
nations are like indecently dressed wom en: they tem pt the evil-minded.
A frican Regionalism: Pragmatic, Substantial hicrementalism  
M w alim u has consistently been an advocate of African regionalism. While 
now viewed as a radical on this topic, he was in fact deeply doubtful of the 
realism  of jum ping from national to continental, and from limited contacts 
and econom ic links, to supra-national union. In the early Pan African de­
bates he was the cautious, pragm atic increm entalist to N krum ah’s vision­
ary (and, arguably, totally im practicable) radicalism.
Regionally he aspired to joint independence of Kenya, Uganda andT an- 
ganyika (even if it delayed Tanganyika’s independence). From  the failure of 
that initiative and its 1963 successor, he cam e to view supra-nationalism , 
as o p p o sed  to  the  com m on p u rsu it of m u tu a lly  identified  com m on
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interests, as im practical, and the economic arena as the m ain avenue for 
building regionalism paralleled by com m on support for liberation move­
m ents through what becam e the Frontline States (FLS).
T he East African C om m unity (EAC), in its incarnation  as the East 
African Com m on M arket/East African C om m on Services O rganisation, 
was basically a K enya-centric  colonial inheritance. T anzan ian  efforts 
to reform it appeared to progress over 1965-70 but, following the Amin 
coup in U ganda, the basis for further progress d isin teg rated  and the 
1970s econom ic crisis (together with the deep anim osity of a significant 
fraction  of the K enyan leadership to the EAC and T anzan ia) swept 
away the EAC.
T he Zanzibar U nion was not a direct product of M w alim u’s com m it­
m ent to regionalism. Pre-U nion Zanzibar had an unstable G overnm ent in 
danger of becoming a pawn dependent on, and controlled by, one or more 
external powers and with the possibility of external counter-coups against 
client regimes. Given its proximity to, and links w ith,Tanganyika that pros­
pect alarm ed the m ainland Governm ent and, not least, the president. A 
confederal Union on term s very favourable to Zanzibar (and systematically 
abused by them on the economic front to be still m ore exploitatively ad­
vantageous) was hastily concluded. Zanzibari practice has rarely been con­
gruent with the M ainland, was often deeply em barrassing to Nyerere and 
his G overnm ent, and infuriated Tanzanian econom ic technocrats and the 
average Tanzanian.
T he Union is not a success except in the sense that it spared Zanzibar 
(and M ainland Tanzania) from the islands becom ing another Com oros. It 
is doomed if a referendum  is held. A majority in favour in Zanzibar is slightly 
m ore likely than not; a huge majority against the U nion on the M ainland 
would be virtually certain.
T he clearest example of what M walimu sees as a viable road to first 
stage economic and regional co-ordination, leading ultim ately to broader 
(in content and scope) Pan-Africanism is the S ou thern  African Develop­
m ent Com m unity (SADC). Beginning as the econom ic arm  of the FL S, it 
immediately added the three non-FLS independent States in its region and 
has become, with the independence of Nam ibia and the a ttainm ent of Black 
majority rule in South Africa, more im portant than its parent.
SADC is a very atypical regional body. Its principles of selection are 
mutually perceived com m on interests better, or only, pursued jointly. Goods, 
services and knowledge-production co-ordination leading to trade, not tar­
iff cuts leading to production, constitute its strategic th rust. In that sense it 
is the only African conceptualised regional body. T he  o thers are all too 
clearly im port models imperfectly modified from  the E E C  even if they are 
prom oted by Africans. Perhaps not coincidentally SA D C is the m ost suc­
cessful. It has recognised external dependence for investm ent resources as 
a fact of life and set out to influence its level and allocation by reasoned, 
regional priority project/program me packages. Its Annual C onference is
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the only continuing Consultative G roup overwhelmingly designed, staffed 
and m anaged by the recipients.
A frica , the World Economy and the South
In  the mid 1960s and again in the 1980s M walimu feared that Africa would 
in fact be pushed out of the in ternational economy. He was never an advo­
cate of autarky, but of m anaged and less unequal external economic rela­
tions. Over 1968-80 he appears to have believed progress toward in ter­
national econom ic reform (on the basis of a social dem ocratic shift in in ter­
national econom ic structures toward lesser inequality and a greater role in 
decision-m aking for poor countries in line with the stillborn Brandt Re­
port) was practicable.
W hile always an advocate of Sou th-S ou th  co-operation, and of a techni­
cal infrastructure to make it operational, his raising o f ' t  to top strategic 
priority  (as exemplified by his chairing the South Commission) came from 
the 1980s disillusion with the trajectory of the world economy. His present 
position is that South-South (as well as African regional) economic linkage 
m ust be developed both to reduce unilateral dependence on the N orth  and 
to increase bargaining leverage with the N orth . W hether he is very optim is­
tic as to short-term  progress on this road is a somewhat different question.
M w alim u, the Fund and the B ank
N yerere has acquired a reputation as a root-and-branch enemy of theW orld 
Bank and, m uch m ore pointedly, the IMF. While by no means wholly wrong, 
at least so far as the F und  is concerned, this is somewhat simplistic. U ntil 
1979 T anzania’s relations with bo th  F und and Bank were relatively good. 
R obust dialogue took place on occasion bu t at no time threatened contin­
ued broadly am icable relations. T h e  neo-liberal prescriptions of the F und  
and  the Bank in the early 1980s (from  which the Bank at least has in large 
m easure resiled over the past five years) certainly would have increased 
tensions and led to m ore agreem ents to disagree.The assurance with which 
simplistic partial prescriptions, w ithout adequate contextual diagnoses, were 
ra ther casually pu t forward as universal curatives, would have led to robust 
criticism  for failure to be adequately expert or pragmatic.
B u t the real anger, and , on occasion, very atypical shouting, by Nyerere 
has a rather different cause. After 1980 Tanzania was far more dependent 
on external resource transfers than before, and the Fund and Bank were 
rapidly building up gatekeeper and co-ordinator roles so that they signifi­
cantly influenced all official resource transfers no t just their own. On that 
basis they sought to provide or im pose overall economic policy prescrip­
tions w ith, in m any cases, a m arked lack of diplomatic skills. Given the 
im portance N yerere attached to econom ic policy as a key element in at­
taining developm ent, this was seen by him  (not necessarily erroneously) as 
de facto recolonisation by fairly crude financial blackmail. T hat was totally 
unacceptable as a m atter of principle, unlike policy debate disagreem ent
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+9 and com prom ise on particular projects or policies.
T he 1984-6 transition to working relations with F un d  and Bank was 
backed by Nyerere as a necessary step to revive resource inflows. It did not 
alter his view that the Bank and Fund were acting on behalf o f a deeply 
inequitable world econom ic system, operating from  an inadequate  devel­
opm ent vision, and using unacceptably coercive tactics. O nce he had re­
tired as president he felt quite justified in voicing these views.
The Vision and the Record
How Does One Evaluate Thought?
To evaluate a political and social thinker on the im m ediate results of his 
ideas is hardly reasonable or normal; unless they simply vanish w ithout a 
trace. Socrates was forced to com m it su ic ide , C h ris t was cruc ified , 
Machiavelli never regained his lost posts, Adam  S m ith’s ideas influenced 
policy with a lag of about three-quarters of a century, David R icardo and 
John Stuart Mill are not remem bered as parliam entarians.
O n the tests of w hether the issues he addresses are of lasting im por­
tance, w hether his approach is both incisive and insightful and w hether it 
is, directly or indirectly, still of live concern both to scholars and to persons 
interested in political processes (not least Tanzanians and S ou thern  Afri­
cans), M w alim u’s vision stands up well. It is in fact m ore congruen t with 
present ‘second liberation’ thought than it was with the dom inan t African 
political thinking and practice of 1960-85.
O ne characteristic of M w alim u’s thought is that it is rooted in African 
thought (tradition) but is also clearly innovative (individual talent). At the 
same time it is also influenced and inform ed by political and social th ink­
ing from traditions outside Africa and in a style accessible bo th  to  Africans 
and globally.That is relatively unusual as m ost writing g rounded  in African 
tradition interacts only to a limited extent with other traditions, while m ost 
W estern-influenced A frican thought (as w ith  m ost S ov ie t-in fluenced  
thought) appears to have rather shallow African roots.
A n d  Political Leadership?
M walimu Nyerere has never claimed to be prim arily a th inker in the aca­
dem ic or detached analyst sense, but rather to be prim arily a practising 
politician and aspiring statesm an. It is therefore relevant to look at the 
heritage of the 25 years during which he led independent T anzania before 
retiring as president (or the nearly 30 years before retiring as Party  chair­
m an). On the political/national com m unity side especially in com parison 
to other African States, the heritage is positive:
• A tradition of competitive elections and accountability  (leading to a
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relatively smooth and unforced opening of the political arena to m ulti­
party  competition) has been established, and within it is a sense of fair 
play. (M ulti-partyism was, for exam ple, assum ed to require a rapid, total 
end to State finance for any Party, including the governing one.)
• An orderly succession with the H ead of State retiring voluntarily followed 
by a genuine debate (within the Party) on his successor.
• Only limited institutional changes, notably limiting the term  of office of 
successor presidents (since M walim u shared the general view he was un ­
likely to abuse power, but that this might not be true of all his successors), 
were needed at the time of transition to the next president.
• A genuine choice of leaders, from president on, existed; Nyerere was not 
the great baobab tree under which nothing grew, rather his style of gov­
ernance did allow a new generation of political leaders to emerge.
• Tanzanians do view their State as legitimate, their Governm ent as basi- 
• cally public spirited (even if their views on its com petence and the quality
of som e present leaders are m uch less uniformly positive) and their nation 
as a symbol and com m unity with a real m eaning for them.
• E thnic, religious and sub-national tensions, while not absent, are no higher 
than in many old-established States, and the use of force to deal with do­
m estic issues is very m uch the exception (not least because to use the army 
domestically is not seen as an option and the police have never been given 
the resources to act as enforcers for repressive measures).
• Because of the pluralism within C C M , and the presence of relatively strong 
local and national non-governmental broad-m em bership bodies (especially, 
bu t no t only, religious ones, nationally and locally), Tanzania has a rela­
tively strong and plural civil society as well as moderately secure rule of 
law (only m oderately because of w idespread public disapproval of the 
m agistracy), and substantial room  for the exercise of ‘traditional’ hum an 
rights.
•  W hile perhaps less widely assented to , there is a substantial majority for 
continued emphasis on broad access (directed toward universal) basic serv­
ices provided by the State which, by whatever m ethod, do not exclude on 
the grounds of poverty, and a belief that equity and moral economy are 
am ong the proper concerns of G overnm ent.
I t is an impressive heritage, no t simply in the African context or in contrast
with 1961 inTanzania, bu t also in a world in which explosive intra-national
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increasingly prevalent in N orthern  as well as Southern polities.
What Economic Results?
It would be idle to assert that the economic growth or even the structural 
transform ation heritage of Tanzania’s first thirty years of independence is 
equally positive. Large num bers of mistakes, some always likely to be such 
and others not corrected prom ptly when problem s em erged, can be cited. 
T he fact that many decisions, especially in agriculture and agricultural 
m arketing, were m ade on the basis of expert foreign advice (often from 
bodies who now criticiseTanzania for having acted as it did on their earlier 
advice) is not a basis for exoneration. Tanzania, including N yerere, should 
have queried m uch of this advice, and the way it was being inserted, rather 
earlier than it did.
T hat said, the m acro-econom ic record is far better than  is usually sup­
posed. Over 1961-78Tanzanian output grew by som ew hat over 4 per cent 
a year (perhaps 1.5 per cent per capita) and food production by 3.5 per 
cent (1 per cent per capita). N either is brilliant but bo th  are well above 
both the Tanganyika colonial record and the SSA averages. In 1990 con­
stant price output stood about one-sixth above 1980 (versus virtually u n ­
changed for SSA as a whole), per capita it was about one-tenth down (versus 
a fifth to a quarter fall for SSA overall), and food production  per capita 
continued on a slowly rising trend (very m uch an exception). W hile som e­
what above the SSA average, Tanzania’s net per capita external resource 
flow (which peaked in 1973-4) ranged around 10th to 15th of the 40 SSA 
economies for which data are relatively readily available. In addition , its 
export mix has faced poor market conditions so no external deus ex machina 
exists to explain the above-average result in what from  a perspective of 
resource quality and geographic location is a below-average piece of real 
estate.
The ranking of Tanzania in per capita dollar term s as the w orld’s second 
poorest economy (with a fall of over 50 per cent in the 1980s) is artifactual, 
coloured both by very rapid devaluation and inadequate adjustm ent of the 
prices used in G D P  calculations. The constant price o u tp u t sum m aries 
give a better picture.
Tanzania has a relatively equitable distribution system if the key criteria 
chosen are the limited num bers in destitution, w ithout significant access to 
basic public services, or not assisted in the context of natural disasters. 
Famine deaths have been unknown in Tanzania since som ew hat before in­
dependence, and rem ained so during the 1992-3 food scarcity period fol­
lowing the partial 1991-2 drought. Life expectancy, literacy and reduction 
of m alnutrition show better results and/or trends than is typical for low 
incom e SSA countries.
T he po st-1984 recovery appeared by 1992 to have restored an overall 
growth trend of about 4 per cent; 3 per cent to 3.5 per cent for food; and 
6 per cent for m anufacturing. But on those trends and a 2.75 per cent
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population growth rate, restoring 1980 per capita overall and m anufactur­
ing ou tpu t levels would take until 1998-2000 and to regain the 1978 peaks 
would take until perhaps 2002-4 even if neither natural calamities, nor 
econom ic catastrophes set back the pace of growth. W hether that pace is 
adequate to maintain a high level of effort or would lead to implosion is 
problem atic, even if the growth pattern  is better than current prospects for 
a m ajority of African economies.
M ore seriously, the inherited and continuing lack of an articulated ex­
po rt strategy makes the present recovery dependent on external finance 
because under 40 per cent of m inim um  necessary im ports (at 4 per cent 
overall growth) is earned from exports. T he past random  delinking from 
old exports accentuated by term s of trade collapse m eans that at least 
$500-600 million a year (1990 prices) of new and value-added exports is 
needed to restore reasonable external account self-reliance. N o one, in­
cluding the World Bank, has the slightest operational scenario of how this 
m ight be achieved, nor is a coherent set of p roduct studies to identify key 
po ten tial com ponents in progress.
T h u s, while Tanzania’s economic perform ance has usually been, and is 
again, above the SSA average and better than might have been expected, it 
is below Tanzanian expectations, possibly below sustainable levels and dan­
gerously flawed on the external account self-reliance front. T hat heritage, 
whatever its causes, is a deeply problem atic one. H ad M walimu opted for 
policy shifts earlier in the 1980s (rather than allowing three years drift while 
seeking consensus) and placed his full influence behind export diversifica­
tion and expansion from 1970 onward, the situation would be objectively 
better and the prospects significantly less problem atic. On the economic 
institu tional and personnel side, the situation is also mixed. T he num bers 
of com peten t econom ic civil servants, academics and, to a lesser extent, 
m anagers (private or public) is relatively impressive especially in contrast 
to  1961 .T he  basic State econom ic institutions are in working order, as are 
a growing num ber of public enterprises. But the entire structure has been 
strained by constant crises, disappointed by failed efforts and made less 
diligent by radical erosion of real salaries. In contrast to many nominally 
less poor SSA econom ies, Tanzania’s econom ic personnel and institutions 
are impressive. N onetheless, they are at m ost barely adequate for m anag­
ing co n tin u ed  recovery and less than  adequate  in several sectors for 
relaunching sustained development.
Try and Try Again
A Tanzanian characteristic shared by M walimu Nyerere and which has been 
valuable in the past, is setting high goals and being very critical if they are 
not m et, even if substantial progress was m ade in the right direction; this 
characteristic is in danger of becom ing negative. T he  major achievements 
of 1984-1992 (grounded in the last major econom ic policy changes Nyerere 
con tribu ted  to and presided over) are seriously underrated with a danger of
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an implosion and descent into fatalistic acceptance of an inability to influ­
ence events which would be very dangerous; not least in leading to  a 
fatalistic failure to seek to hold present office-holders to high standards. 
This is not helped by C C M ’s tendency to repeat old slogans as m antras 
rather than to restate its continued com m itm ent to equity, access and pov­
erty reduction in term s relevant to 1990s challenges, possibilities and 
achievements.
Despite mistakes, some still not learned from nor corrected, a m ore ap ­
propriate valediction on the present state of M walim u N yerere’s heritage 
as a hum an-centred developm ent practitioner may be the Kizanaki proverb 
he used in respect to South-South efforts:
Rabbit, Rabbit, where are you going?
I am going out to kill the elephant.
Can you really do that?
Well, I ’ll try and try again.
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